Abstract Interacting forces of climate change and globalization are transforming the Arctic. Triggered by a non-linear shift in sea ice, this transformation has unleashed mounting interest in opportunities to exploit the region's natural resources as well as growing concern about environmental, economic, and political issues associated with such efforts. This article addresses the implications of this transformation for governance, identifies limitations of existing arrangements, and explores changes needed to meet new demands. It advocates the development of an Arctic regime complex featuring flexibility across issues and adaptability over time along with an enhanced role for the Arctic Council both in conducting policy-relevant assessments and in promoting synergy in interactions among the elements of the emerging Arctic regime complex. The emphasis throughout is on maximizing the fit between the socioecological features of the Arctic and the character of the governance arrangements needed to steer the Arctic toward a sustainable future.
INTRODUCTION
As we move deeper into the Anthropocene, the volatility of socioecological systems is increasing. For those endeavoring to steer such systems, this puts a premium on the capacity to identify approaching tipping points in a timely manner and on the ability to respond to the resultant changes in ways that capitalize on opportunities associated with them. Nowhere is this challenge more prominent than in the Arctic, a region experiencing transformation arising from the interactive forces of climate change and globalization. Positive feedbacks in the Arctic resulting from mechanisms like the lowering of surface albedo following the recession of sea ice and the release of methane resulting from the melting of permafrost are accelerating the impacts of climate change (ACIA 2004; . Dramatic in biophysical terms, these processes have also triggered a rapid increase in interest in the Arctic on the part of private and public actors attracted by prospects of enhanced commercial shipping, oil and gas development, industrial fishing, and ship-based tourism (e.g., Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009; Howard 2009 ). Those concerned with the environmental impacts of such activities have become more active as well. There is no reason to assume that the results of transformative change in the Arctic will be uniformly negative. But regardless of their implications for various interest groups, this transformation is likely to stress existing Arctic governance systems and to put a premium on efforts to devise revamped practices more appropriate to the ''new'' Arctic (Anderson 2009) . In this article, I explore needs for governance arising from the transformation of the Arctic and examine ways to address these needs both through adaptation to changes already occurring and through anticipatory responses to changes likely to occur in the future.
TIPPING POINTS IN THE ARCTIC
A tipping point is a point at which a relatively small perturbation can cause a qualitative change in the future state of a system, ultimately passing a threshold that constitutes a point of no return regarding the behavior of the relevant system . Before reaching such a point, a system will be resilient in the sense that it can handle a wide range of pressures or disturbances without experiencing transformative change (Holling 2002) . Once the system reaches a tipping point, small perturbations can trigger disproportionate consequences in such forms as a state change or a shift to a new trajectory differing in a nonlinear fashion from the trajectory the system was on previously. A species whose population drops below a specific threshold will move onto a trajectory leading over time to extinction. A glacier whose mass balance passes a critical threshold will shift onto a trajectory leading to its eventual disintegration and disappearance. Socioeconomic systems are subject to similar dynamics. An economic system that crosses some critical threshold with regard to a combination of investment, earnings, and employment will flip from a static state onto a trajectory of sustained growth or from a trajectory of steady growth into a period of recession or even depression. A governing coalition that loses public support will cross a threshold at some point that shifts it onto a trajectory leading to collapse and replacement by an alternative coalition.
More challenging is the identification of tipping points in the socioecological systems that have become a defining feature of the Anthropocene. Still, examples are not hard to locate, at least with the benefit of hindsight. The collapse of the cod stocks of the northwest Atlantic in the early 1990s came as a surprise to many (Hutchings 1996) . But we can now see that a combination of anthropogenic drivers in the form of over-harvesting and biophysical forces in the form of climate change unfolding over a period of time produced this abrupt change (Harris 1998) . Similar observations are in order regarding the dust bowl phenomenon in the American southwest during the 1930s. Inappropriate farming practices that became entrenched over a period of time combined with a prolonged drought to produce a crisis featuring severe land degradation and largescale outmigration from the region (Worster 2004) . In California, on the other hand, the decision to introduce irrigation on a massive scale allowed the Imperial Valley to become one of the leading agricultural areas in the country (Pincetl 1999) . The drivers of such non-linear events include human actions and biophysical forces interacting with one another to produce transformative changes (Figs. 1, 2, 3) .
These examples suggest clarifications regarding several conceptual issues relating to tipping points that have important implications for Arctic governance. A common expectation is that once a tipping point is reached, nonlinear change will follow in a manner that is abrupt, irreversible, and typically nasty from the perspective of human welfare. Some cases do fit this simple model. But, for the most part, reality is more complex. As cases involving the extinction of species and languages or the disintegration of glaciers make clear, dramatic changes that become inevitable once a tipping point is reached may play out over a period of years, decades, or even centuries (e.g., Lenton et al. 2008) . By the time we are able to separate the signal of the relevant change unambiguously from the noise of other developments occurring during the same time period, the actual tipping point may be long passed. State changes are seldom fully reversible in the sense of a system returning more or less precisely to some pre-existing state. But this does not mean that a system will move quickly Fig. 1 The recent Arctic Council meeting in Nuuk, Greenland. Photo: Ulrik Bang/BANG.GL, reprinted with permission toward a new equilibrium once a state change occurs. An initial state change can precipitate a period of turbulence featuring erratic behavior over a period of time. The period of socioeconomic turbulence touched off by the French Revolution offers a clear example. Nor are transformative changes uniformly nasty in human terms. State changes often generate opportunities that improve the lot of some, even as they prove destructive in terms of the interests of others. The ongoing debate about the extent to which climate change will produce winners as well as losers exemplifies this proposition (e.g., Adger et al. 2006; Stern 2009 ). Overall, we should expect to encounter high levels of uncertainty about both the causes and the consequences of state changes in socioecological systems.
In examining the challenges of governance arising from transformative change in the Arctic, it will help to pay Fig. 3 The Norwegian liquid natural gas (LNG) plant on Melkøya, Hammerfest, liquefies gas from the Snøhvit gas field. Photo: panoramio.com particularly close attention to the following features of tipping points:
• Small perturbations can trigger large changes; any of a number of triggers can precipitate transformative change in systems operating in critical zones.
• Tipping points are hard to anticipate; their occurrence more often than not takes key actors by surprise.
• While abrupt changes or system flips sometimes follow tipping points, periods of turbulence are common.
• Transformative change is apt to disrupt existing governance systems, but the results may prove positive as well as negative.
• Periods of turbulence following the occurrence of tipping points can provide opportunities to reform institutional arrangements that would be out of the question during normal times.
The Arctic now exhibits volatility at a number of levels. We can see this in biophysical terms in the population dynamics of species like caribou and eider ducks (Wassmann et al. 2011 ) and in socioeconomic terms in the ''boom-bust cycles'' that play out again and again in some parts of the Arctic (Young 1992) . The emphasis in this article, however, is more holistic. It focuses attention on the Arctic as a whole, treating the circumpolar north as a large and dynamic socioecological system. The interacting forces of climate change and globalization have come together in this case to trigger transformative change on a regional scale (Lenton et al. 2008) . Although the identity of the trigger mechanism in this setting is subject to debate, a likely candidate for this status is the dramatic recession and thinning of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean that occurred during the summer of 2007 (e.g., Wadhams 2012) . Despite the high level of uncertainty surrounding such matters, most experts believe that the Arctic is now on course to become largely ice-free, at least during the summer months, within two or three decades and that this development is now irreversible (Wang and Overland 2009) . There is no sign yet of a new equilibrium emerging at the regional level. Cascades of change-both biophysical and socioeconomic in nature-will be a prominent feature of the Arctic for some time to come (Duarte et al. 2012) . Although this makes it hard to foresee the future of the Arctic in holistic terms, some of the consequences of this dynamic process are already becoming clear. It is not premature to begin thinking about the resultant needs for governance and ways to address them.
GOVERNANCE IN TURBULENT TIMES
Governance is a social function involving the establishment and administration of assemblages of rights, rules, and decision making procedures intended to steer socioecological systems toward pathways that are collectively desirable and away from pathways that are undesirable Delmas and Young 2009) . Simple examples include the creation of regulatory restraints on the behavior of individual users/appropriators needed to avoid the tragedy of the commons, the development of burden-sharing mechanisms needed to avoid or overcome free-rider behavior with regard to the supply of public goods, and the generation of social capital needed to solve a variety of other collective-action problems. An important conclusion emerging from recent research on governance centers on what has become known as the problem of fit (Galaz et al. 2008) . Simply put, a major determinant of the effectiveness of governance systems is the extent to which they are designed with the principal features of the relevant biophysical and socioeconomic systems in mind. To be successful, a governance system created to manage human use of a renewable resource, for instance, must feature mechanisms for setting allowable harvest levels on a periodic basis and for allocating shares of allowable harvests or ''catch shares'' among users. A governance system designed to reduce air or water pollution must feature some mechanism to curb the temptation on the part of individual members of the relevant group to behave as free riders. Particularly important in the context of this discussion is the observation that governance arrangements created to steer socioecological systems that are either highly volatile or actually experiencing transformative change must be nimble in the sense of having the capacity to respond promptly to changing conditions and to make significant adjustments if they are to be effective over time. The importance of this observation is heightened by the fact that governance arrangements exhibit a natural tendency to become path dependent, developing standard operating procedures, and resisting adjustments that move them out of the comfort zone associated with adherence to these procedures.
There are two ways to address the needs for governance arising from the transformation unfolding in the Arctic today. An adaptive approach centers on efforts to adjust, reform, or even replace existing governance arrangements to address changes already occurring. An anticipatory approach, by contrast, emphasizes responses to changes expected to occur in the future. Both approaches have merit; it would be highly undesirable to think of them in either-or terms. Given constraints regarding the time, material resources, and social capital available to deal with such matters, however, policymakers often face pressures to make tradeoffs between efforts to meet current challenges and efforts to devise anticipatory responses to challenges likely to occur in the future. Because projections regarding future developments involve (relatively) high levels of uncertainty and policymakers have a natural tendency to discount the future, anticipatory responses to future developments may receive short shrift in policy processes. This is one reason why we are often taken by surprise by non-linear and abrupt occurrences and find ourselves poorly prepared to deal with them when they do occur.
ADAPTIVE MEASURES
What do we know about the transformative changes currently underway in the Arctic that can guide efforts to adapt existing governance arrangements to maintain or even enhance their effectiveness? This section explores answers to this question emphasizing (i) linkages between the Arctic and the outside world, (ii) connections among distinct elements of the Arctic treated as a large and dynamic socioecological system, and (iii) the pace of changes occurring in the Arctic.
The Arctic in World Affairs
The changes now occurring in the circumpolar Arctic are tightening the links between this region and the rest of the Earth system. Dramatic examples involve both climate change and the growth of worldwide interest in exploiting the Arctic's natural resources (e.g., Smith 2010; Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012) . Although climate change is driven almost entirely by non-Arctic forces, the high latitudes of the northern hemisphere are on the leading edge in terms of experiencing dramatic impacts of this change. Feedback mechanisms involving the lowering of the Arctic Ocean's albedo (e.g., Perovich et al. 2007) , the growing impact of the deposition of carbon soot (e.g., McConnell et al. 2007) , and the melting of the Greenland ice sheet (e.g., Ridley 2009) serve to magnify the impacts of climate change on northern systems. The prospect of increased accessibility to the Arctic arising from the effects of climate change has generated a remarkable surge of interest among outsiders in the region's natural resources (Howard 2009 ). Taken together, these developments make it essential to devise governance arrangements for the Arctic that are able to take into account the interests and behavior of major nonArctic actors, such China, Japan, Korea, and the European Union, that are both sources of environmental change and contenders for resources like oil and gas located in the region. An essential requirement is to avoid the onset of a new era of core/periphery relations in which the fate of the Arctic and its peoples lies largely in the hands of distant policymakers who do not know much about the Arctic and have little incentive to learn more. Yet simply ignoring the growing interests and influence of outside forces will not do as a strategy for governing the Arctic effectively in the future.
The Arctic as a Socioecological System
Equally important are linkages among the various components of the circumpolar Arctic itself treated as a large and dynamic socioecological system. The prominent roles of sea ice, permafrost, and photoperiodicity in this region heighten the importance of minimizing environmental impacts associated with the extraction of the region's nonrenewable resources. Similar remarks are in order regarding the harvesting of renewable resources, including seabirds, caribou, and seals, that are prone to dramatic population swings, even in the absence of human interventions (Nuttall and Callaghan 2000) .
The implication of these observations is that it is critical in addressing issues of governance in the Arctic to avoid strategies leading to functional fragmentation. This does not mean that it is essential to address all questions of governance in the Arctic at once in a single comprehensive and integrated arrangement. There is much to be said for thinking in terms of a regime complex in charting a course for efforts to enhance the effectiveness of Arctic governance during the near-term future (Young 2011) . But responses to this challenge should make a point of embracing the principles of ecosystem-based management and spatial planning to avoid the dangers resulting from fragmentation (Crowder et al. 2006) . The Arctic Ocean Review (http://www.aor.is/), currently in progress under the auspices of the Arctic Council's Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, is a promising initiative in this regard.
The Pace of Change
The pace or speed of the transformation now occurring in the Arctic constitutes a third factor that has far-reaching implications for the practice of governance. It would be a mistake to exaggerate the biophysical significance of the non-linear change in the Arctic's sea-ice regime that occurred during 2007 (e.g., Wadhams 2012). Nonetheless, this development has triggered a sharp shift in attitudes worldwide regarding the importance of the Arctic and its resources. What was once a region evoking little interest in mainstream international circles has developed with remarkable speed into a focus of attention in foreign ministries and corporate boardrooms around the world. There is no guarantee that this quickening of interest in the Arctic and its resources will last indefinitely. But there is a growing sense that we cannot afford to adopt a watching brief in this realm, waiting to see what transpires over the next 5-10 years before deciding what adjustments are needed in the governance arrangements operative in this region today. The need to take action sooner rather than later is unmistakable.
ANTICIPATORY RESPONSES
This brings us to the second approach to Arctic governance in this era of transformative change. Are there anticipatory responses that make sense in the light of our current knowledge of Arctic systems and expectations regarding the future of the Arctic as a large and dynamic socioecological system and that are feasible politically as well as economically under current circumstances? Here, too, I consider three distinct themes: (i) early warning systems, (ii) rapid response capabilities, and (iii) deliberative approaches to decision making under uncertainty.
Early Warning
Early warning is largely a matter of monitoring key indicators on an ongoing basis and drawing proper inferences from the data collected. At one level, this seems like a straightforward proposition. As monitors pick up the first signs of a significant departure from business as usual, we should take steps to intervene with stabilizing measures. Yet it is remarkable how often we fail to put in place procedures needed to anticipate tipping points in large scale systems even when we know that we are operating in a danger zone, are conscious of the costs of being taken by surprise by state changes, and are aware of the consequences of responding in ways that are both slow and inept. This is true with regard to biophysical transformations (e.g., the collapse of the cod stocks of the northwest Atlantic), political transformations (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union), and economic transformations (e.g., the recession of 2008-2009). Why is it so hard to anticipate these state changes, and what are the implications of this fact for the future of Arctic governance? Partly, the answer has to do with finding the material resources needed to track key indicators of the behavior of these complex systems on a continuous basis. Given the natural tendency of policymakers to discount the future and marginalize low-probability events, the resources needed to track developments that may (or may not) occur in the future are hard to come by. They become attractive targets for cost-cutting measures when pressures to reduce budget deficits mount. In part, however, this problem is a matter of understanding what variables to monitor and how to monitor them. As cases like the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the northwest Atlantic cod stocks suggest, we tend to think in linear terms and have a hard time recognizing the onset of non-linear changes. This is particularly true in the case of socioecological systems in which triggering events may come from either the biophysical side or the socioeconomic side with amplifying changes ricocheting back and forth via the human-environment interactions characteristic of these systems. In the Arctic during the foreseeable future, this dynamic is likely to feature interactions between biophysical processes like the behavior of sea ice and socioeconomic developments like the extraction of hydrocarbons made possible by the recession of sea ice.
Rapid Response Capacity
The development of capacity to respond rapidly becomes prominent in cases where we know that non-linear and abrupt changes are possible but are unable to predict when they will occur and what form they will take. We are used to thinking about rapid responses in connection with emergencies, such as fires or automobile accidents, and with extreme events, such as hurricanes or floods, though even here experience suggests that such capabilities are often inadequate and tend to atrophy over time. With respect to transformative changes occurring at a regional level, the creation, and maintenance of rapid response capabilities is even more challenging. In the Arctic during the coming years, it is easy to imagine the occurrence of oil spills under adverse conditions or the sinking of cruise ships carrying hundreds or thousands of passengers in inaccessible areas. If current trends regarding human activities in the Arctic continue or even accelerate, the demand for rapid response capabilities will grow quickly. National initiatives can play a role in meeting this demand. But they will not suffice. The need for international coordination will mount steadily. The signing of an Arctic-wide agreement on search and rescue at the seventh ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2011 is a promising step in this realm. More steps of this sort will be needed and sooner rather than later as human activities in the Arctic intensify.
Decision Making under Uncertainty
Whatever the results of efforts to create early warning systems and rapid response capabilities, the need to make decisions about Arctic issues under conditions of uncertainty will be unavoidable in the future. Uncertainty in this setting is a matter of both unknown probabilities (e.g., the likelihood of a major accident associated with offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic) and unknown consequences (e.g., the impacts of such an accident on biophysical and socioeconomic systems). Doing nothing is not an option; non-decisions in situations of this sort are simply decisions of a certain sort. Powerful actors will join forces to compel public authorities to allow access to the natural resources of the Arctic, if it appears that demand for these resources is robust and if there are ways to overcome the physical barriers to extracting and transporting them to markets in a cost-effective manner. There is some tendency for policymakers to err on the side of underestimating the costs associated with Arctic developments because the region is remote and therefore not prominent in the thinking of key players and especially because the sparseness of the region's population creates a situation in which the voice of the Arctic is faint in many policymaking forums. On the other hand, there are those who are influenced by the Antarctic experience and who see the remoteness of the Arctic as an opportunity to treat the region as a natural reserve without encountering insurmountable political opposition. Whatever the merits of these views, we need to develop rules of thumb or heuristics that can guide decision making under uncertainty in a region like the Arctic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) . To the extent that the occurrence of tipping points leads to non-linear and especially abrupt changes, the development of rules of thumb that can be activated without a need for complex and protracted calculations becomes particularly important.
THE WAY FORWARD
What conclusions about governance in the Arctic can we draw from this line of reasoning? Periods of transformative change are anxiety producing for those whose interests are at stake. But they also generate opportunities to break away from the constraints of path dependence and to introduce substantial changes in governance systems . The current period of turbulence in the Arctic presents an opportunity to revise and enhance existing arrangements (e.g., the Arctic Council) that is too good to be missed. We may not have another opportunity to make substantial changes in prevailing arrangements for a generation or more. Taking these observations as a point of departure, how should we think about the architecture of a strengthened governance system for the Arctic and what role(s) can the Arctic Council play in this effort?
An Arctic Regime Complex
The way forward is to work toward the development of a coherent regime complex in the sense of ''an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area'' (Raustiala and Victor 2004) or, to put it in other words, a network of distinct regime elements that operate simultaneously in the broad issue area of Arctic governance (Underdal and Young 2004) . Such a complex would fall somewhere in the middle of a continuum running from fully integrated institutional arrangements at one extreme to highly fragmented collections of arrangements at the other (Keohane and Victor 2011) . It would encompass a number of distinct elements dealing with relatively specific issues, operating under different auspices, and encompassing overlapping but not identical sets of members.
A mandatory Polar Code dealing with commercial shipping in the Arctic, for instance, could operate under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and apply to all those engaging in or desiring to engage in such commerce. Arrangements governing the management of wildlife, such as the existing regime for polar bears, could be limited to the range states and apply to those areas constituting the habitat of the relevant species. Regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) could cover spatially defined sectors of the Arctic and include the relevant coastal states together with states whose fishers operate or are interested in operating in specific areas. Initiatives designed to bolster or secure the rights of the Arctic's indigenous peoples could engage those Arctic states in which indigenous peoples reside and provide prominent roles for indigenous peoples' organizations. Efforts to regulate the impact of pollutants (e.g., persistent organic pollutants or carbon soot) on Arctic systems would benefit from integration into multilateral environmental agreements (e.g., the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change). Taken together, the resultant mosaic of arrangements could go far toward addressing the emerging needs for governance in the Arctic region and would be generally in line with the pattern of recent developments in this realm. The trick will be to manage this collection of distinct elements in such a way as to produce a network of loosely coupled but coherent arrangements capable of addressing a range of distinct yet interlocking issues in a coordinated fashion.
A Regime Complex Versus an Arctic Treaty
The advantages of a regime complex over the status quo are easy to identify. The transformation of the Arctic is tightening the links between the region and the outside world, giving a variety of actors incentives to initiate new activities in the region and producing situations that may lead to rising tensions if nothing is done to devise rules of the game governing the behavior of participants in such activities. As a result, the need to reexamine and revamp existing governance arrangements for the region is now widely acknowledged, even by those who disagree more or less sharply regarding the pros and cons of different approaches to meeting this need.
A somewhat more nuanced argument is required to explain the merits of the regime complex approach in contrast to recent proposals calling for a comprehensive Arctic treaty. Although there are a number of variants of proposals for an Arctic treaty, they all call for an integrated governance system whose core is a legally binding agreement. The attractions of this approach are easy to understand. An Arctic treaty could foster coherence with regard to the region's governance needs and might promote compliance on the part of actors inclined to pay serious attention to the arrangement due to its legally binding character.
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, the option of addressing emerging governance needs through the negotiation of a comprehensive and legally binding Arctic treaty has a number of drawbacks (Young 2011) . In all likelihood, the negotiation of such a treaty would be a protracted process. The eventual outcome might well be a framework agreement lacking in substance, adding little to the existing provisions of the Law of the sea convention, and requiring a prolonged and possibly unsuccessful effort to fulfill the requirements for bringing it into force (Elferink 2005 ). An Arctic treaty would almost certainly leave much to be desired in terms of the twin issues of flexibility across issues and adaptability over time (Keohane and Victor 2011) . The needs for governance in the Arctic today are diverse. Addressing these needs successfully will require a collection of arrangements establishing different approaches to individual issues and encompassing different sets of actors. Even more critical is the need for nimbleness in a setting in which transformative change or turbulence is a fact of life. Reopening the provisions of a comprehensive agreement is a risky business; it can trigger processes that get out of hand opening a Pandora's box of issues. This is not to say that we should ignore opportunities to move the system of Arctic governance over time in the direction of integration on the fragmentation-integration continuum, pushing step-by-step for increased coherence and for the introduction of measures designed to encourage synergistic interactions among the various elements of the Arctic regime complex (Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Oberthür and Stokke 2011) . But the idea of moving directly from the status quo to a fully integrated governance system for the entire region does not seem like a recipe for success.
The Role of the Arctic Council
Assuming we opt for the regime complex approach to addressing Arctic governance needs during the foreseeable future, what is the appropriate role for the Arctic Council? The council is not endowed with authority to make formal decisions about public issues on its own. What it does best is to identify emerging issues in a timely manner, provide authoritative assessments regarding important features of these issues, draw them to the attention of non-Arctic specialists, move priority concerns toward the head of the queue on relevant policy agendas, and offer a venue for efforts to address specific concerns. This is a role that the council should continue to play as we move forward in the development of an Arctic regime complex. A new function that will become increasingly important and that the council is taking steps to address centers on the pursuit of coherence in the sense of making a concerted effort to insure that the various elements of the Arctic regime complex are compatible, to apply the principles of ecosystem-based management in this setting, and to bolster the effectiveness of the complex as a whole.
To perform these functions well during a period of transformative change, the Arctic Council will need strengthening. Recent developments in this regard are distinctly promising. The steps articulated in the May 2011 ministerial declaration of the Arctic Council to establish a permanent secretariat, to explore opportunities for the council to apply the principles of ecosystem-based management, and, more generally, to examine progressive measures to enhance the role of the council (http://www. arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents) are all constructive. Next steps should include concrete measures to provide the council with a dependable revenue stream, to enhance the council's capacity to play an integrative role in managing the evolving Arctic regime complex, and to devise more effective methods for taking into account the concerns of important non-Arctic states and non-state actors. These are not radical proposals. They involve issues already on the council's agenda, though addressing them vigorously could lead to some important changes in the way the council does business. The critical thing in this regard is to focus on strengthening the role of the council as a body capable of responding in a nimble fashion to evolving needs for Arctic governance that arise in turbulent times.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The Arctic is in the midst of a transformation; it is probable that the region will experience a period of turbulence lasting for some time. What is needed under these circumstances is a governance system that is both flexible across issues and adaptable over time. The result, at least for now, will be a regime complex located somewhere in the middle of the continuum ranging from unacceptable fragmentation to unattainable integration. Some will regard this as a messy solution, one that is lacking in coherence and not sufficiently attuned to operationalizing the idea of ecosystem-based management or addressing important problems of compliance. No doubt, the regime complex arising in the Arctic will not meet a standard of perfection during the foreseeable future. But the virtue of this approach is that can provide a good fit between the current circumstances of the Arctic treated as a large and dynamic socioecological system and the institutional arrangements created to address the function of governance in this setting.
